

**Anglický jazyk 1. ročník**

Rozvoj demokratického vzdělávání na

HŠ Vršovická

reg. č. CZ.07.4.68/0.0/0.0/19\_068/0001418



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# Vazba na ŠVP

Charakteristika tématu

Výchova k demokratickému občanství se zaměřuje na vytváření a upevňování takových postojů a hodnotové orientace žáků, které jsou potřebné pro fungování a zdokonalování demokracie. Nejde však pouze o postoje, hodnoty a jejich preference, ale také o budování občanské gramotnosti žáků, tj. osvojení si faktické, věcné a normativní stránky jednání odpovědného aktivního občana.

## Současný stav

**Výchova demokratického občana**

**Charakteristika průřezového tématu**

Výchova k demokratickému občanství se zaměřuje na vytváření a upevňování takových postojů a hodnotové orientace žáků, které jsou potřebné pro fungování a zdokonalování demokracie. Nejde však pouze o postoje, hodnoty a jejich preference, ale také o budování občanské gramotnosti žáků, tj. osvojení si faktické, věcné a normativní stránky jednání odpovědného aktivního občana.

Výchova k demokratickému občanství se netýká jen společenskovědní oblasti vzdělávání, v níž se nejvíce realizuje, ale prostupuje celým vzděláváním a nezbytnou podmínkou její realizace je také demokratické klima školy, otevřené k rodičům a k širší občanské komunitě v místě školy.

***Přínos tématu k naplňování cílů rámcového vzdělávacího programu***

K odpovědnému a demokratickému občanství je třeba mít dostatečně rozvinuté klíčové kompetence (komunikativní kompetence, personální a sociální kompetence, kompetence k řešení problémů a k práci s informacemi,…), proto je jejich rozvíjení při výchově k demokratickému občanství velmi významné.

***Kromě toho jsou žáci vedeni k tomu, aby:***

− měli vhodnou míru sebevědomí, sebeodpovědnosti a schopnost morálního úsudku;

− byli připraveni si klást základní existenční otázky a hledat na ně odpovědi a řešení;

− hledali kompromisy mezi osobní svobodou a sociální odpovědností a byli kriticky tolerantní;

− byli schopni odolávat myšlenkové manipulaci;

− dovedli se orientovat v mediálních obsazích, kriticky je hodnotit a optimálně využívat masová média pro své různé potřeby;

− dovedli jednat s lidmi, diskutovat o citlivých nebo kontroverzních otázkách, hledat kompromisní řešení;

− byli ochotni se angažovat nejen pro vlastní prospěch, ale i pro veřejné zájmy a ve prospěch lidí v jiných zemích a na jiných kontinentech;

− vážili si materiálních a duchovních hodnot, dobrého životního prostředí a snažili se je chránit a zachovat pro budoucí generace.

***Obsah tématu a jeho realizace***

Výchova k odpovědnému a aktivnímu občanství v demokratické společnosti zahrnuje vědomosti a dovednosti z těchto oblastí:

− osobnost a její rozvoj;

− komunikace, vyjednávání, řešení konfliktů;

− společnost – jednotlivec a společenské skupiny, kultura, náboženství;

− historický vývoj (především v 19. a 20. století);

− stát, politický systém, politika, soudobý svět;

− masová média;

− morálka, svoboda, odpovědnost, tolerance, solidarita;

− potřebné právní minimum pro soukromý a občanský život.

## Inovace

Při realizaci projektu se chceme zaměřit především na tato témata:

− **ve vytvoření demokratického klimatu školy** (např. dobré přátelské vztahy mezi učiteli a žáky a mezi žáky navzájem);

− v náležitém rozvržení prvků průřezového tématu do jednotlivých částí školního vzdělávacího programu včetně plánované činnosti žáků mimo vyučování;

− v cílevědomém úsilí o dobré **znalosti a dovednosti žáků**, které jsou nezbytně potřebné pro informované a odpovědné občanské a jiné rozhodování a jednání; tyto vědomosti a dovednosti budou žáci nejvíce získávat ve vyučovacích předmětech zaměřených na jazyky, výchovu k občanství, ekonomické předměty a společenskovědní vzdělávání, tedy např. v občanské nauce, v základech společenských věd nebo v dějepisu;

− **v promyšleném a funkčním používání strategií výuky**, např. používání aktivizujících metod a forem práce ve výuce, jako je problémové a projektové učení, kooperativní učení, různé diskusní a simulační metody, metody směřující k rozvoji prosociálního chování, k rozvoji funkční gramotnosti žáků (tj. schopnost číst textový materiál s porozuměním, interpretovat jej, hodnotit a používat pro různé účely) atp.;

− v realizaci mediální výchovy.

# Učební osnovy

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Učivo** | **ŠVP výstupy** | **Inovace** |
| 1. Řečové dovednosti  - receptivní řečové dovednosti: poslech s porozuměním monologických i dialogických projevů, práce s textem  - produktivní řečové dovednosti: překlad  - interaktivní řečové dovednosti: střídání receptivních a produktivních činností, dialogy, e-mail, dopis  2. Jazykové prostředky (lingvistické kompetence)  - výslovnost (zvukové prostředky jazyka)  - slovní zásoba a její tvoření  - gramatika (morfologie a syntax)  - grafická podoba jazyka a pravopis  3. Tematické okruhy  - osobní údaje, rodina, osobní charakteristika  - domov, bydlení  - každodenní život  - volný čas, záliby, prázdniny, cestování  - odívání, nakupování  - počasí, roční období  - české a britské reálie  - odborná témata: stravování, jídla, jídelní a nápojový lístek, jednání s hostem v hotelu a restauraci  4. Komunikační situace  - získávání a předávání informací  5. Jazykové funkce  - obraty při zahájení a ukončení rozhovoru, písemného sdělení, představování  - vyjádření žádosti, prosby, omluvy | Žák:  - čte správně a s porozuměním věcně i jazykově přiměřené texty, orientuje se v textu, najde hlavní myšlenky i další důležité informace  - odpovídá na otázky k textu  - přeloží text, umí používat slovník  - ovládá slovní zásobu k probíraným tématům  - rozumí jednoduchému mluvenému projevu učitele i reprodukovanému projevu cizích mluvčí v rozsahu probrané slovní zásoby a gramatiky  - hovoří v jednoduchých větách v rozsahu probrané slovní zásoby a gramatiky  - umí podat jednoduché sdělení  - umí podat jednoduchou reprodukci známého textu  - zná základní pravidla výslovnosti, přízvuku a intonace  - písemně překládá jednoduché věty  - umí podat jednoduché sdělení ve formě dopisu,  e-mailu  - při výkonu odborné praxe umí anglicky mluvícímu zákazníkovi podat stručnou informaci, popsat a ukázat cestu, přijmout objednávku v restauraci | Žák:  - chápe pojem demokracie  - vědomuje si, že ani jedincům v demokratické společnosti nejsou upírána žádná jejich práva, může se sám rozhodovat  - rozhoduje se sám za sebe |

# Výukové materiály

## Democracy

**Vazba na ŠVP:**

* demokracie je v úzkém kontextu s tematickým celkem Leisure time, neboť právě ve volném čase by se každý jedinec měl zdokonalovat v chápání demokracie

**Organizační formy a metody práce:**

* poslech textu
* čtení textu s porozuměním
* kooperativní výuka
* samostatná práce žáků

**Pomůcky:**

* text
* audio přehrávač

**Cíl:**

* poslech
* orientace v problému

**Zadání:**

1. Poslechněte si následující si text o demokracii.
2. Přečtěte ho a vypište slovíčka, kterým nerozumíte.
3. Vytvořte dvojice nebo menší skupiny a vyhledejte vybraná slovíčka ve slovníku.
4. Vypište 4 odlišné problémy, o které se jedná v normativní demokratické teorii.

**Democracy**

Normative democratic theory deals with the moral foundations of democracy and democratic institutions. It is distinct from descriptive and explanatory democratic theory. It does not offer in the first instance a scientific study of those societies that are called democratic. It aims to provide an account of when and why democracy is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions. Of course, normative democratic theory is inherently interdisciplinary and must call on the results of political science, sociology and economics in order to give this kind of concrete guidance.

First, it outlines some different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally desirable at all. Second, it explores the question of what it is reasonable to expect from citizens in large democratic societies.  This issue is central to the evaluation of normative democratic theories as we will see. A large body of opinion has it that most classical normative democratic theory is incompatible with what we can reasonably expect from citizens. It also discusses blueprints of democratic institutions for dealing with issues that arise from a conception of citizenship. Third, it surveys different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation. These last two parts display the interdisciplinary nature of normative democratic theory. Fourth, it discusses the issue of whether and when democratic institutions have authority and it discusses different conceptions of the limits of democratic authority.

**Slovníček**

Foundations=základy

Distinct=odlišný

Explanatory=vysvětlující

Inherently=neodmyslitelně

guidance=vedení

approaches=přístupy

desirable=žádoucí

evaluation=hodnocení

citizenship=občanství

equality=rovnost

## The Justification of Democracy

**Vazba na ŠVP:**

* demokracie je v úzkém kontextu na tematický celek Leisure time, neboť právě ve volném čase by se každý jedinec měl zdokonalovat v chápání demokracie

**Organizační formy a metody práce:**

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* kooperativní výuka
* samostatná práce žáků

**Pomůcky:**

* text
* audio přehrávač

**Cíl:**

* poslech
* orientace v problému

**Zadání:**

1. Přečtěte a přeložte definici demokracie.
2. Odpovězte na otázky k textu v angličtině.
3. a) Where can be democrasy?

b) What is the function of normative democratic theory?

**Democracy Defined**

First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which I mean decisions that are made for groups and that are binding on all the members of the group. Second, this definition means to cover a lot of different kinds of groups that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight to it. It is quite compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to an assembly where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building. “Democracy” may refer to any of these political arrangements. It may involve direct participation of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions.

The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how.   For instance, Joseph Schumpeter argues (1956, chap. XXI), with some force, that only a highly formal kind of democracy in which citizens vote in an electoral process for the purpose of selecting competing elites is highly desirable while a conception of democracy that draws on a more ambitious conception of equality is dangerous. On the other hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762, Book II, chap. 1) is apt to argue that the formal variety of democracy is akin to slavery while only robustly egalitarian democracies have political legitimacy. Others have argued that democracy is not desirable at all. To evaluate their arguments we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of humanity and society from which they proceed.

**The Justification of Democracy**

We can evaluate democracy along at least two different dimensions: consequentially, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision making; or intrinsically, by reference to qualities that are inherent in the method, for example, whether there is something inherently fair about making democratic decisions on matters on which people disagree.

**Liberty**

Some argue that the basic principles of democracy are founded in the idea that each individual has a right to liberty. Democracy, it is said, extends the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life to the domain of collective decision making. First, each person's life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Second, only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould (1988, pp.45-85) conclude that only when some kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at self-government. Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. This right is established at least partly independently of the worth of the outcomes of democratic decision making. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share.

Here we can see the makings of an argument against instrumentalism. To the extent that an instrumentalist wishes to diminish a person's power to contribute to the democratic process for the sake of enhancing the quality of decisions, he is committed to thinking that there is no moral loss in the fact that our power has been diminished. But if the liberty argument is correct our right to control our lives is violated by this.

One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision.

The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement. And so it is hard to see how any political decision making method can respect everyone's liberty.

## The Problem of Democratic Citizenship

**Vazba na ŠVP:**

* demokracie je v úzkém kontextu na tematický celek Travelling, protože při cestování je důležité mít znalosti této problematiky

**Organizační formy a metody práce:**

* poslech textu
* čtení textu s porozuměním
* kooperativní výuka
* samostatná práce žáků

**Pomůcky:**

* text
* audio přehrávač

**Cíl:**

* poslech
* orientace v problému

**Zadání:**

1. Přečtěte a přeložte článek o problému demokratického občanství.
2. Odpovězte na otázky k textu v angličtině:

* What didi Plato argue about?
* Who was Anthony Downs?

**The Problem of Democratic Citizenship**

A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine whether ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large society. There are three distinct problems here. First, Plato (*Republic*, Book VI) argued that some people are more intelligent and more moral than others and that those persons ought to rule. Second, others have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves intelligently to politics?

Third, since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that a vote will affect the outcome of an election are nearly indistinguishable from zero. Worse still, Anthony Downs has argued (1957, chap. 13) that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote. On the assumption that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes made.

These observations pose challenges for any robustly egalitarian or deliberative conception of democracy. Without the ability to participate intelligently in politics one cannot use one's votes to advance one's aims nor can one be said to participate in a process of reasoned deliberation among equals. So, either equality of political power implies a kind of self-defeating equal participation of citizens in politics or a reasonable division of labor seems to undermine equality of power. And either substantial participation of citizens in public deliberation entails the relative neglect of other tasks or the proper functioning of the other sectors of the society requires that most people do not participate intelligently in public deliberation.

## Legislative Representation

**Vazba na ŠVP:**

* demokracie je v úzkém kontextu na tematický celek Describing the town or city, protože článek vysvětluje problematiku legislativního zastoupení.

**Organizační formy a metody práce:**

* poslech textu
* čtení textu s porozuměním
* kooperativní výuka
* samostatná práce žáků

**Pomůcky:**

* text
* audio přehrávač

**Cíl:**

* poslech
* orientace v problému

**Zadání:**

1. Přečtěte a přeložte.
2. Vytvořte malé skupinky žáků a pohovořte o legislativě ve městě, ve kterém žijete.
3. Porovnejte informace z článku s vašimi znalostmi.

**Legislative Representation**

A number of debates have centered on the question of what kinds of legislative institution are best for a democratic society. What choice we make here will depend heavily on our underlying ethical justification of democracy, our conception of citizenship as well as on our empirical understanding of political institutions and how they function. The most basic types of formal political representation available are single member district representation, proportional representation and group representation. In addition, many societies have opted for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases, combinations of the above forms have been tried.

Single member district representation returns single representatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations to the legislature and is present most prominently in the United States and the United Kingdom. The most common form of proportional representation is party list proportional representation. In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a whole. Group representation occurs when the society is divided into non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.

Many have argued in favor of single member district legislation on the grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to more stable government than other forms of representation. The thought is that proportional representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart rather quickly. The post war experience of governments in Italy appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single member district representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the stability of governments by virtue of its favoring a two party system of government. Each election cycle then determines which party is to stay in power for some length of time.

Charles Beitz argues (1989, chap. 7) that single member district representation encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to consider. This results from the tendency of this kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compromise in citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest groups, hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well in a democracy.

In criticism, advocates of proportional and group representation have argued that single member district representation tends to muffle the voices and ignore the interests of minority groups in the society. Minority interests and views tend to be articulated in background negotiations and in ways that muffle their distinctiveness. Furthermore, representatives of minority interests and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and interests are often systematically underrepresented. Sometimes these problems are dealt with by redrawing the boundaries of districts in a way that ensures greater minority representation. The efforts are invariably quite controversial since there is considerable disagreement about the criteria for apportionment. In proportional representation, by contrast, representatives of different groups are seated in the legislature in proportion to citizens’ choices. Minorities need not make their demands conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that characterize single member district systems so their views are more articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.

Another criticism of single member district representation is that it encourages parties to pursue dubious electoral campaign strategies. The need to appeal to a large, diverse and somewhat amorphous sector of the population can very often be best met by using ambiguous, vague and often quite irrelevant appeals to the citizens. Thus instead of encouraging reasonable compromise the scheme tends to support tendencies towards ignorance, superficiality and fatuousness in political campaigns and in the citizenry. It encourages political leaders to take care of the real issues of politics in back rooms while they appeal to citizens by means of smoke and mirrors. Of course, those who agree in the main with the elitist type theories will see nothing wrong in this, indeed they may well champion this effect. Proportional representation requires that parties be relatively clear and up front about their proposals, so those who believe that democracy is ethically grounded in the appeal to equality tend to favor proportional representation (see Christiano 1996, chap. 6).

Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Young (1990, chap. 6), have argued that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very well under proportional representation. They may not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.

One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be biased in an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of those who do think of linguistic conflict as important.

## The Authority of Democracy

**Vazba na ŠVP**

* demokracie je v úzkém kontextu na tematický celek Plans for the future a Interpersonal relationships

**Organizační formy a metody práce:**

* poslech textu
* čtení textu s porozuměním
* kooperativní výuka
* samostatná práce žáků

**Pomůcky:**

* text
* audio přehrávač

**Cíl:**

* poslech
* orientace v problému

**Zadání:**

1. Poslechněte si článek a potom přečtěte a přeložte.

**The Authority of Democracy**

Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any obligation of citizens to obey the democratic decision. In particular, the question arises as to whether a citizen has an obligation to obey the democratic decision when he or she disagrees with it.

There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it is morally justified in imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens’ duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the right to choose?

With respect to democracy we can imagine three main approaches to the question as to whether democratic decisions have authority. First, we can appeal to perfectly general conceptions of legitimate authority. Some have thought that the question of authority is independent entirely of whether a state is democratic. Consent theories of political authority and instrumentalist conceptions of political authority state general criteria of political authority that can be met by non democratic as well as democratic states. Second, some have thought that there is a conceptual link between democracy and authority such that if a decision is made democratically then it must therefore have authority. Third, some have thought that there are general principles of political authority that are uniquely realized by a democratic state under certain well defined conditions.

Readers who are interested in more general conceptions of political authority may consult the entry for political authority for a discussion of the issues. And the second kind of view has been largely abandoned by democratic theorists. I do wish to discuss the third kind of conception of the political authority of democracy.

**Instrumentalist Conceptions of Democratic Authority**

In general, instrumentalist conceptions of authority make no special mention of democracy. The instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one ought to respect the democracy when one disagrees with its decisions. But there may be many other instrumental considerations that play a role in deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey. And these instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is considering obedience to democracy or some other form of rule.

There is one instrumentalist approach which is quite unique to democracy and that seems to ground a strong conception of democratic authority. That is the approach inspired by the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Goodin, 2003, chap. 5; Estlund, 2002, 77-80). According to this theorem, on issues where there are two alternatives and there is a correct answer as to which one is correct, if voters have on average a better than even chance of getting the right answer, the majority is more likely to have the right answer than anyone in the minority. And the likelihood that the majority is right increases as the size of the voting population increases. In very large populations, the chance that the majority is right approaches certainty. The theorem is an instance of the law of large numbers. If each voter has an independently better than 0.5 chance of getting the right answer then the probability that more than 0.5 of the voters get the right answer approaches 1 as the number of voters becomes very large.

Such a result makes sense of Rousseau's famous passage: “Each citizen, in giving his suffrage, states his mind on that question [concerning what the general will is]; and the general will is found by counting the votes. When, therefore, the motion which I opposed carries, it only proves to me that I was mistaken and that what I believed to be the general will was not so” (Rousseau 1762, 95-96). On this account, we have a conception of the authority of democracy. The members of the minority have a powerful reason for shifting their allegiance to the majority position, since each has very good reason to think that the majority is right.

There are a number of difficulties with the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the case of voting in elections and referenda. First, many have remarked that voters’ opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition building. And the theorem only works on independent trials. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways so that some sectors of the society do not have the relevant information while others do have it. And modern societies and politics seem to instantiate this kind of segmentation in terms of class, race, ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place and so on. One can always have good reason to think that the majority is not properly placed to make a reasonable decision on a certain issue when one is in the minority. Finally, all voters approach issues they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases thus undermining the sense that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote.

One further worry about the Condorcet Theorem's application seems to be that it would prove too much anyway for it undermines the common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. Indeed, even in scientific communities the fact that a majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps give them pause (Goodin 2003, chap. 7).

**Democratic Consent Theories of Authority**

Some consent theorists have thought that there is a special relation between democracy and legitimate authority at least under certain conditions. John Locke argues (1690, sec. 96) that when a person consents to the creation of a political society, he necessarily consents to the use of majority rule in deciding how the political society is to be organized. Locke thinks that majority rule is the natural decision rule when there are no other ones. He argues that once a society is formed it must move in the direction of the greater force. One way to understand this argument is as follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we think that there is likely to be disagreement beyond the question of whether to join society or not, then we must accept majority rule as the appropriate decision rule. This interpretation of the greater force argument assumes that the expression “greater force” is to be understood in terms of the equal worth of each person's interests and rights, so the society must go in the direction in which the greater number of persons wants it to go.

To be sure, Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals in consenting to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and when taxes may be levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of property (Locke, 1690, sec. 140). This does seem to be moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate authority. How democratic this conception is depends on how we understand property in Locke's discussion. If it includes the rights of citizens generally, then we have an argument for democratic decision making. But if the idea of property only includes holders of private property then we have an argument for, at best, a highly attenuated form of democratic decision making.

Another consent-based argument for the claim that democracy is necessary for legitimate authority asserts that when people participate in the democratic process, by their act of participation they consent to the outcome, even if it goes against them. Their participation thereby lends legitimacy to the outcome and perhaps even to the democratic assembly that is elected by citizens. On this account, the acts of voting, for example, are also acts of consent to the outcome of the voting. So participants are thereby obligated to comply with the decision made by the majority.

The problem with all these variations on consent theory is that they face a worrisome dilemma. On the one hand, they seem to involve highly suspect interpretations of behaviors that may or may not imply the kinds of consent that these theorists have in mind. Hume's worries about consent theorists’ interpreting residence in a territory as consent to its government have close analogs in this kind of context (Hume, 1748, p. 263). Why suppose that a person's vote is understood by that person to be consent to the outcome of the vote. Why not suppose that the person is merely trying to have an impact on the outcome? Or why suppose that a person's membership in society—the “consent” signaled by remaining in the society—really commits him to agreeing that decisions must be made by majority rule?

On the other hand, if we eschew the interpretative route the only way to think of the person's vote as constituting consent is if we think that the person ought to consent to the outcome or ought to know that he is consenting to the outcome. The fact that they ought to consent to the outcome because they have participated is sufficient, on some views, to produce an obligation. And the thesis that they ought to know that they consent is usually grounded in the idea that it they ought to be consenting when they vote. But this kind of view seems to get far away from the basic idea of consent theorists, which is that whether persons consent or not should be up to them and should not be determined by the correct moral view. Consent theory is grounded in the need a way to think of government has legitimacy when people disagree about whether it is just or right.

**Liberty and Authority**

The liberty approaches to the justification of democracy provide alternative approaches to the idea of the authority of democracy. The idea here is that democracy has authority to the extent that people freely bring about the democratic decision. The reason for this is that democracy merely extends their activity of self-determination to the political realm. To the extent that self-determination is an preeminent value and democracy extends it to the political realm, allegiance to democratic decisions is necessary to self-determination and therefore is required by virtue of the pre eminent importance of self-determination.

But here is a worry about this kind of approach. It seems either to presuppose that decisions will have unanimous support or it requires a number of substantive conditions on self-determination, which conditions do a lot of the work of generating obligations to democracy. For instance, if a decision must be made by majority rule, one strategy for reconciling this with self-determination is to say that a self-determining person must accept the legitimacy of majority rule when there is disagreement. This may be because the self-determining person must accept the fundamental importance of equality and majority rule is essential to equality under circumstances of disagreement. So if one argues that one cannot be self-determining unless one accepts equality then one might be able to argue that the self-determining person must accept the results of majority rule. But this argument seems to make the authority of democracy depend primarily on the importance of equality. And one must wonder about the importance of the idea of self-determination to the account.

**Limits to the Authority of Democracy**

If democracy does have authority, what are the limits to that authority? A limit to democratic authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic authority. When the principle is violated by the democratic assembly, the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight of the authority is overridden. A number of different views have been offered on this issue. First, it is worthwhile to distinguish between different kinds of moral limit to authority. We might distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority. An internal limit to democratic authority is a limit that arises from the requirements of democratic process or a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy. An external limit on the authority of democracy is a limit that arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements of democracy. Furthermore, some limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which are principles that weigh in the balance against the principles that support democratic decision making. Some considerations may simply outweigh in importance the considerations that support democratic authority. So in a particular case, an individual may see that there are reasons to obey the assembly and some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience.

On the other hand some limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the principles which ground the limit outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at least they are severely weakened.

**Persistent Minorities**

This account of the authority of democracy also provides some help with a vexing problem of democratic theory. This problem is the difficulty of persistent minorities. There is a persistent minority in a democratic society when that minority always loses in the voting. This is always a possibility in democracies because of the use of majority rule. If the society is divided into two or more highly unified voting blocks in which the members of each group votes in the same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in the minority will find itself always on the losing end of the votes. This problem has plagued some societies, particularly those with indigenous peoples who live within developed societies. Though this problem is often connected with majority tyranny it is distinct from the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the majority attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its conception of good treatment. It is just that the minority never agrees with the majority on what constitutes proper treatment. Being a persistent minority can be highly oppressive even if the majority does not try to act oppressively. This can be understood with the help of the very ideas that underpin democracy. Persons have interests in being able to correct for the cognitive biases of others and to be able to make the world in such a way that it makes sense to them. These interests are set back for a persistent minority since they never get their way.

The conception of democracy as grounded in public equality can shed light on this problem. It can say that the existence of a persistent minority violates public equality. In effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.

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